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The U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan:                          
An Act of Self-Defense Under Article 51? 
Sikander Ahmed Shah1 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2001, a tragic chain of events stunned the world.  On 
the morning of that fateful day, terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial 
jetliners, ramming two of the hijacked planes into the two towers of the 
World Trade Center in New York City.2  The towers were eventually 
reduced to rubble.3  Moments later, the third jetliner rammed into the 
Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the fourth plane crashed in the 
Pennsylvania countryside, supposedly on its way toward the capital.4  The 
results were devastating, leaving 2,973 people dead, most of them civilians.5  
On October 7, 2001, U.S. and British forces commenced bombing raids on 
Afghanistan.6  The United States declared that the attack was self-defense, 
under Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter.7  To date, countless 
Afghani civilians have been killed as a result of continuing allied air strikes 
and operations.8  Many more individuals have suffered starvation because 
of the continued air raids and suspended food supply deliveries.9  Most 
individuals have been displaced from their homes and are refugees in, or on 
the borders of, Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian Republics.10  Even 
given the history of warfare and internal strife that has plagued Afghanistan 
for the last thirty years, and the breakdown of the administrative and 
distributive capacity that this has engendered, the suffering of the Afghani 
people arising from U.S. action in the country is without measure.  Posterity 
will judge U.S. action in Afghanistan not only on the basis of the legality of 
its military actions, but also on the basis of restorative and rehabilitative 
actions undertaken in acknowledgement of such suffering.  Despite the 
significant impact this war has had on many Afghani civilians, few have 
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seriously considered whether the U.S. attack on Afghanistan qualifies as 
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.11 
Accordingly, Part I of this article begins this discussion with an analysis 
of the requirements for self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
including a definition of terrorism.  Part II argues that the U.S. attacks on 
Afghanistan were not self-defense under Article 51.  Assuming for 
argument’s sake that the United States’ initial attacks were justified, Part III 
considers whether the United States’ continued attacks on Afghanistan can 
also be justified as self-defense.  Finally, Part IV addresses what the 
international community can do to remedy this problem.  One idea would be 
to empower specialized monitoring bodies under the UN to determine the 
occurrence of an armed attack, assist all concerned parties to settle their 
disputes amicably, and prevent unnecessary acts of retaliation and 
retribution under the guise of self-defense.  Finally, this paper concludes 
that the U.S. attack on Afghanistan was not self-defense under Article 51 of 
the UN Charter. 
I. SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE UN CHARTER 
This section defines exactly what behaviors constitute self-defense under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.  The section begins with a summary of the 
applicable text of the UN Charter.  This textual summary is followed by a 
discussion of the term terrorism with a focus on state terrorism.  Finally, the 
section concludes with a discussion of the term “armed attack” under 
Article 51.  
Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, member states are to “refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”12  Unless such 
force is specifically authorized by the Security Council, member states are 
only allowed to use force or aggression under the Charter if such force or 
aggression is taken in self-defence.13  Article 51 states that “[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
          The U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan 155 
VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.”14   
A. Definition of Terrorism 
Terrorism must be defined in order to determine if an attack of terrorism 
warrants self-defense by the state under attack.  To date, terrorism is an 
undefined term in international law.  To understand the concept of 
terrorism, it is imperative first to trace its history and evolution under 
international law.  In addition, regardless of the somewhat nebulous 
definition that accompanies the definition of terrorism, it is important to 
remember that “[u]se of the term [terrorism] implies a moral judgment; and 
if one party can successfully attach the label terrorism to its opponent, then 
it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint.”15 
After the UN was created, two schools of thought emerged which shaped 
the dialogue about the definition of terrorism.16  On one side were those 
who argued that normative responses to prohibited conduct could not be 
devised, unless there was agreement on what activities were actually 
prohibited.17  On the other side, the realists believed that it was impossible 
to agree upon a definition of terrorism and that the best way to proceed was 
to define terrorism on a case by case basis.18  To the realists, no bright-line 
rule existed; therefore, whether or not particular conduct was sanctioned as 
terrorism could depend on very slight variations in the factual 
circumstances surrounding the conduct.19   
In 1979, the Ad-Hoc Committee on Terrorism, which was created by the 
UN General Assembly, attempted and failed to come up with a concrete 
definition of terrorism.20  Some individuals argued that actions against 
prohibited targets should be defined as terrorism.  Others emphasized that 
the purpose of the action(s) undertaken was the crucial determinant, while 
others looked at the characteristics and motives of the perpetrators.21  The 
problem with these definitions was that they were too broad, created 
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uncertainty, and could be used against actions undertaken by states, which 
the states themselves considered to be legitimate under the norms of 
international law.22  Despite years of effort on the General Assembly’s part, 
significant difficulties like those outlined in this section prevented the 
Assembly from providing more than a few elements of what constituted 
terrorism.23 
One significant issue that has hindered the establishment of a concrete 
definition of terrorism has been the lack of initiative by the world 
community.  Specifically, developed Western nations were afraid that if 
terrorism was concretely defined, the actions they undertook for self-
defense or for international peace purposes might eventually be perceived as 
terrorism.24  In addition, third world nations were afraid that legitimate 
freedom and national liberation movements would be classified as 
terrorism.25 
With the fall of the Soviet Empire, for all practical purposes, the UN 
came under the direct control of the West.26  In 1989, the UN passed a 
resolution that no terrorist activity could be justified even if it was 
committed during a freedom struggle.27  Henceforth, the Western realists 
slowly started establishing norms and behavior that were termed as 
“terrorism” under specific circumstances.  Offenses against diplomats, 
states taking hostages, allowing one’s territory to be used for military action 
against another state, and actions against another state’s civilians (real acts 
or threats that instill fear or terrorize the public) were all deemed terrorist 
activities.  However, these norms have not been universally applied.28  
1. State Terrorism 
Even though the international definition of terrorism is still evolving, 
state terrorism has been defined with somewhat more specificity because it 
is distinct in that it necessarily implies that acts of international terrorism 
are taking place.29  With regard to state terrorism, the question arises 
whether there is sufficient nexus between the state and terrorist activities 
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associated with it, in order to establish that state terrorism exists therein.  
More specifically, state terrorism has been defined as “acts of violence 
which are outside the accepted acts of international diplomacy and rules of 
war.”30  It is important to note that the General Assembly’s Declaration on 
Friendly Relations (2625 (XXV)) stated that “each State has a duty not to 
organize or encourage acts of civil war and terrorism on another State’s 
territory or to tolerate on its own territory, activities organized with a view 
to perpetrating such acts.”31  Thus, the key issue in a state terrorism inquiry 
is whether there is a sufficient nexus between the state and terrorist 
activities associated with it.  Specifically, four levels of state involvement in 
terrorism have been identified: (1) state inaction, (2) state toleration, (3) 
state support, and (4) state sponsorship.32   
a) Level One: State Inaction  
The first level of state terrorism is known as state inaction.  State inaction 
occurs when a state lacks the ability to control terrorist activities taking 
place from its soil.33  Under such circumstances, states have sometimes 
asked for external assistance to deal with this form of terrorism.34  However, 
states have also used state inaction as an excuse to violate the territorial 
integrity of other states without waiting for requests for assistance.35  
Unfortunately, world condemnation of such incursions has been muted or 
the responsibilities of the intervening states have been held to be 
diminished.36  The legal basis for the intervening state’s conduct was 
established in the Corfu Channel case.37  The case involved British warships 
traversing Albanian territorial waters, where a number of British sailors 
were killed when British ships unexpectedly struck mines.38  The court, 
while finding that Albanian sovereignty had been violated, nonetheless 
observed that Albania’s complete failure to exercise its sovereign powers 
created “attenuating circumstances for the United Kingdom government.”39 
Using state inaction to justify violations of a state’s territoriality is 
gravely problematic because more often than not it will be the poor third 
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world countries that are perceived as unable to handle supposed terrorist 
outfits operating from their soil.  Consequently, such justifications provide a 
pretext for richer, more powerful states to imperil the norms of international 
law by arguing that the gravity of the terrorist acts justified their response.   
This result is problematic because the UN was created for the very 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security.40  Bypassing the 
procedures laid out within the UN Charter questions the purpose of the 
Charter’s existence.  While the UN has not always been effective, and while 
it is easily dominated by a few states, it still enjoys the support of the 
international community.41  Therefore, allowing individual states to 
establish a variable standard for violating another state’s sovereignty 
grossly undermines the basis upon which the international community 
exists.  When this process is bypassed, the safety of the international 
community is compromised. 42   
b) Level Two: State Toleration 
The next level of state involvement in terrorism is termed state 
toleration.  State toleration takes place when a state is aware that terrorist 
outfits are operating from its soil, and the state, though possessing the 
capacity to suppress such activities, abstains from doing so.43  Significantly, 
the state does not provide any sort of a support to such outfits.44   
Additionally, these outfits are self-supporting and generally have some form 
of foreign assistance. 45   
c) Level Three: State Support 
A higher level of state involvement is state support.  Here the state 
provides all kinds of support to terrorist outfits—military training, arms, 
rhetorical support, financing, tactical support, safe havens, logistical 
support, travel documentation, intelligence, and transportation.46  However, 
such states do not direct the specific terrorist acts; in other words, these 
states stop short of assuming command and control of such outfits. 47  
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d) Level Four: State Sponsorship 
The gravest form of state involvement is state sponsorship.48  State 
sponsorship occurs when states utilize terrorism “as another weapon of 
warfare to gain strategic advantage where they cannot use conventional 
means.”49  The terrorist is, in all practicality, a de facto agent of the culpable 
state.  State sponsorship therefore occurs when a state directs, controls, and 
commands the terrorist outfits and their activities.50 
2. Determination of State Involvement as Terrorism 
Many questions arise at this juncture.  How is one to determine the level 
of state involvement, and how can one determine the authenticity and level 
of proof required to determine the level of state involvement?  Are remedial 
actions undertaken by states accused of terrorism intended to curb terrorism 
or to punish terrorists in order to exonerate themselves?  
It is difficult, if not impossible, to provide answers to these questions.  
For example, there is absolutely no international consensus on the level of 
proof necessary to determine state sponsorship.51  Unfortunately, in the past, 
the majority of states that have retaliated on the basis of possessing 
sufficient proof against other states have later been found to be incorrect in 
their assessment and wrong about the soundness of proof relative to the 
degree of terrorist involvement.52  Even when states are later found to be 
involved in terrorism, their degree of involvement has often been 
insignificant enough that an armed retaliation was not justified.  Thus, as a 
result of fallacious reasoning to determine state sponsorship, many innocent 
states and quasi-innocent states have been attacked and numerous civilian 
installations have been destroyed.53  
Retaliating states often respond hastily and do not wait to substantiate the 
questionable proof they possess.54  The primary reason for hasty decisions 
to attack states for the purpose of curbing terrorism is that the states making 
these decisions are predominantly strong military powers and often possess 
disproportionate military strength relative to the states they attack.  These 
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heavily armed states are often reluctant to retaliate hastily or forcefully 
against states with equal or greater military might in comparison, despite 
the perception that the other state may be a sponsor of terrorism.55  The 
rationale for this decision is that the repercussions of such retaliatory attacks 
can be immense and the well-placed fear of a full-fledged war is obvious.56  
In other words, a deterrent is in place. 
The behavior that attacking states exhibit on the basis of inadequate proof 
sends the wrong signals to the world community and sets a precedent for all 
states.  It encourages states to impetuously commit aggression against other 
states on the basis of self-defense without the risk of being reprimanded for 
any errors in judgment.  This is true not only for the states that use this 
precedent as a pretext for justifying their self-interests, but also for those 
that suffer from the absence of an adequate paradigm for determining 
factual disputes (such as proof regarding state terrorism), as these states 
become frustrated and then make unilateral determinations. 
B. Definition of Armed Attack  for Purposes of Article 51  
For any measures to be taken in self-defense under Article 51, there must 
be an armed attack.  The framers of Article 51 purposely utilized the 
restrictive terminology of an “armed attack” instead of an act of 
“aggression” as a necessary condition for undertaking self-defense.57  
According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
while interpreting statutes, words are to be given their ordinary meanings.58  
Thus, applying Article 31’s interpretation to Article 51, armed attack is a 
subset of aggression.59  The consensus definition of aggression,60 which was 
formally adopted by the General Assembly in 1974,61 is a much broader 
concept and does not require actual use of force.  Rather, mere threats of 
force qualify as acts of aggression, which in turn are prohibited under 
Article 2(4).62  Aggression can also be economic in nature.   
On the other hand, states have acknowledged this extremely restrictive 
definition of an armed attack.63  The meanings adduced for armed attack 
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from several dictionaries all imply the actual occurrence of harm, as 
opposed to the mere threat of force.64 Furthermore, Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, which is one of the two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of 
force in Article 2(4), uses the word “occurs” with reference to armed attack, 
and does not talk about the threat of an armed attack.65  Thus, only the 
actual use of force, which results in the violation of the territorial integrity 
of another state, qualifies as an armed attack.66  Retaliation against action 
that does not qualify as an armed attack is anticipatory self-defense which 
has not, as of yet, been condoned in international law.67 However, it is 
important to note that the degree of attack is not so pertinent an inquiry 
when determining if an armed attack has occurred.68  The reason for such a 
holding is that retaliatory responses to armed attacks must be proportional 
under customary international law as discussed in Part IV of this paper.  
Therefore, states are unable to use a trivial incident by cloaking it as an 
armed attack to justify disproportionate retaliatory responses.69 
A more difficult analysis is required when the argument put forward is 
that an armed attack against a retaliating state has occurred and a retaliating 
state indulges in an interceptive attack for self-defensive purposes.  An 
interceptive attack can be defined as an action undertaken to repulse an 
armed attack, “which is imminent and practically unavoidable,”70 when an 
irreversible course of action has taken place,71 but no actual force has yet 
been felt by the retaliating state.72  This theory raises the issue of the degree 
of irreversibility that a course of action needs to attain for it to legitimately 
qualify as an armed attack.  If such actions are truly irreversible, then a 
force is in motion that is no longer under the control of the attacking state; 
therefore, an armed attack has already occurred.73  An interceptive attack in 
such circumstances would be appropriate.  For example, an armed attack 
would take place if a nuclear warhead has been fired by a particular state 
unto another state, and the aggressor state no longer possesses the capability 
to stop the warhead, but the warhead had not yet entered the air space of the 
attacked state.  Conversely, an armed attack would not take place if planes 
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have commenced their journey to conduct air raids on enemy territory, but 
have not yet entered enemy air space or attacked enemy territory.  The 
reason for these different results is that in the latter example, the aggressor 
state has the capability to stop the potential attack.74  
However, this paradigm has some serious shortcomings.  For example, it 
is difficult to determine with absolute certainty the point at which a state 
does or does not not possess the capability to stop a potential force it has put 
in motion.  This might be a simple task in the case of aircrafts about to 
begin air raids, but is a nearly impossible task in the context of fired nuclear 
weapons.  The enemy attack can only be repulsed or intercepted when the 
force put in motion is reversible.  In other words, when the force is 
irreversible, the intercepting state lacks the capability to stop the armed 
attack.  
This less-than-perfect paradigm is a better option than its alternatives.  In 
the absence of such a system of restraint, states will use the concepts of 
anticipatory and interceptive self-defense as pretexts to infringe on the 
territoriality of other states.  Such acts will threaten international peace and 
security and, in the worse case scenario, might lead to the breakdown of the 
present international system.75  Therefore, having this draconian paradigm 
in place provides a disincentive for states to freely violate international 
norms on the basis of self-defense.  This paradigm also places a heavy 
burden of proof, sometimes impossible to satisfy, on states indulging in so-
called retaliatory actions.  Unfortunately, these unreasonable constraints and 
undue hardships will be placed on states that genuinely have a cause of 
action for retaliation.  The world community in such circumstances will be 
less critical of breaches of territorial sovereignty by retaliating states, and 
the force of their condemnation will accordingly be muted.76  
C. Whether State Terrorism is an Armed Attack 
The answer to the question of whether state terrorism is an armed attack 
is less than clear.  Traditionally, states have been held responsible only for 
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actions taken on behalf of the state.77  States have not been accountable for 
private acts.78  However, according to the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
a state is responsible for actions of non-state actors when such actors are in 
direct control of the state.79  
As discussed above, assuming terrorism and an armed attack have been 
perpetuated against a state, the question becomes what degrees of state 
involvement relative to terrorist activities are grave enough to implicate and 
hold responsible the aggressor state for the armed attack.  Fortunately, this 
question has been answered, though in somewhat broad and general terms, 
by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States.80  The 
court held that Nicaragua’s intervention in El Salvador by providing 
“assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or 
other support” did not constitute an armed attack for self-defense 
purposes.81  This phrase has been interpreted to imply that unless an organ 
of the state itself is involved in the terrorism, any form of tactical, logistical,  
financial support, etc., to a terrorist group is insufficient to implicate a state 
for undertaking an armed attack.  
In other words, under the Nicaragua case, a cause for self-defense is 
appropriate only when there is state sponsorship of a terrorist outfit—when 
the outfit is under the direct command and control of the state and is thus a 
de facto organ of the state.82  However, in Nicaragua, the court held that 
where the nexus between the state and the terrorist outfit involved logistical 
support (state support), etc., but did not amount to state sponsorship, a 
wronged state could take “proportionate countermeasures” against the use 
of force.83  What constituted proportionate countermeasures was left largely 
undefined, but the court explicitly stated that coming to the aid of other 
states for collective self-defensive purposes was not within its contours.84  
The level of command and control present between a state and a terrorist 
outfit raises another issue.  What about a situation when, instead of a 
terrorist outfit being a de facto organ of a particular state, a state itself 
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becomes a terrorist organ when it comes under the command and control of 
a terrorist outfit?  Surely this cannot be an instance of state sponsorship.  
This situation is more akin to state inaction, but it is different in the sense 
that citizens of the terrorist-based state might actually be victims of 
terrorism.  In other words, such a state has been hijacked.  Apart from 
justifying its action as self-defense, the retaliating state could bolster its 
position by arguing that application of force against the terrorists does not 
infringe upon the territoriality of the hijacked state because the state is not 
within its own control.  Rather, such application of force would liberate that 
hijacked state and could be termed as a weak form of collective self-
defense—the self-defense being that of the hijacked state.  This form of 
self-defense is weak because the presumption is that the states involved 
herein did not have any kind of a collective self-defense pact.  However, 
this justification is much stronger than the one put forward in the Corfu 
Channel case for violating territoriality.  This is because not only is the 
terrorist-based state not in a position to reign in these terrorists, but the state 
itself is a victim of terrorism.  However, this preceding self-defense 
paradigm justification, similar to the one advanced for “state inaction,” is 
subject to abuse and can provide a pretext for infringement upon state 
territoriality, especially that of third world countries, as discussed earlier.  
What might be a freedom movement for a third world country could easily 
be termed as state hijacking by some developed nations.  
II. THE ATTACK ON AFGHANISTAN AND SELF-DEFENSE 
The September 11 attack on the United States would be classified as a 
terrorist attack under the present rules and norms of international law.85  
The attack primarily targeted civilians and was undertaken to send a 
message to the U.S. government.86  By instilling fear in the citizens of the 
United States, the attackers intended to pressure the U.S. government to 
reconsider foreign policy.  As mentioned earlier, since the demise of the 
Soviet Union, realists have managed to overcome and subdue the normative 
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ideology; therefore, the realist notion of terrorism is controlling today.87  In 
the past, the realists have clearly classified attacks similar in nature to those 
that took place on September 11 as terrorism.88  In addition, normative 
thinkers may also classify the September 11 attacks as terrorism.  Such 
thinkers would argue that there was clear agreement between the 
overwhelming majority of states before the attack took place that such an 
act would fall within the definition of terrorism. 
Some have argued that September 11 was not an act of terrorism but was 
a legitimate use of force undertaken to achieve the inherent right of self-
determination and was part and parcel of a freedom struggle.89  Such an 
argument is without substance, for even if the act had been qualified as an 
act undertaken during the course of a freedom movement, it would still be 
considered an act of terrorism: under the current realist regime, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1989, giving examples of 
situations in which the right of self-determination cannot permit acts of 
terror.90   
In addition, given the specific circumstances of the September 11 attacks, 
the freedom movement justification can be rejected on alternative grounds.  
Assuming that the perpetrators were Islamic militants or members of al 
Qaeda, their freedom objective can either be freedom of Islam from the 
West, specifically the United States, or the freedom of Palestine from Israeli 
occupation,91 the latter directly funded and supported by the United States.  
The former reasoning—that the attack was a freedom struggle—can easily 
be discarded because, as defined under international norms and rules, a 
freedom struggle relates only to nations and states based on the Westphalia 
system.  Islam is not a state, and it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to 
argue that all people practicing the Islamic faith qualify as a nation.  The 
latter freedom justification can be rejected on the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of the attackers were non-Palestinians.  
Furthermore, the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is universally 
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recognized as the true representative of the Palestinian cause and people, 
condemned the attacks as terrorist acts.92  
The September 11 attacks also constituted a terrorist attack on the United 
States because its territorial integrity was purposely and clearly infringed 
upon.  Some critics utilizing a formalistic approach argue that under the UN 
Charter only states are capable of indulging in armed attacks and 
independent terrorist organizations, unless organs of states themselves, 
cannot undertake an armed attack for purposes of Article 51.93  Based on a 
broad interpretation of the intent of the Charter’s framers, the stronger 
argument would be to the contrary because the framers of the Charter did 
not contemplate that one day some terrorist organizations would be as 
strong as states and would have the capability to severely harm states.  
Taking into account the purpose of the framers—protection against an 
armed attack—renders the nature and identity of the individual perpetrators 
as state or non-state actors irrelevant.  
The final inquiry is whether the nexus between the state of Afghanistan 
and the al Qaeda terrorist network is such that al Qaeda is nothing but an 
organ or agent of the Afghani State.  In other words, the question is whether 
state sponsorship is taking place.  This is surely not the case.  Afghanistan is 
one of the poorest countries in the world and is in ruins because of years of 
civil war and drought.94  Furthermore, it does not possess the monetary or 
human capital or any other resources to command and control organizations 
such as al Qaeda.95 
Following the inception of Operation Enduring Freedom, the UN 
Security Council endorsed the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, thereby 
effectively lowering the required threshold of state involvement below what 
had previously been established in both the Nicaragua and Tadic 
judgments.96  The Security Council went on to condemn the Taliban regime 
for allowing Afghanistan to be used by terrorist networks.97  By 
acknowledging that the September 11 attack sanctioned the United States to 
invoke its inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
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the UN Security Council effectively opened the door for states to make 
unilateral decisions on whether an armed attack has taken place on their 
territory.  This paved the way for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Israel’s attack 
on Lebanon, and the development of the Bush doctrine, which clearly 
announced the United States’ intention to preemptively attack in self-
defense.98  The Bush doctrine indicates a clear reversal of U.S. strategy 
because the United States has always opposed preemptive attacks in self-
defense.99  Attacks in preemptive self-defense are still illegal under 
international law.100  Such laxity on the part of the UN Security Council 
could very well unleash state attacks against one another in preemptive 
action.101 
Afghanistan’s involvement could at best be classified as a weak form of 
state support, as they were harboring and providing a safe haven to 
supposed terrorists.  They are considered “supposed”  terrorists because the 
Afghani establishment, the Taliban, even on insistence, was not given any 
evidence by the United States regarding the culpability of al Qaeda 
members, with regard to the September 11 attacks.102  In fact, the ruling 
Taliban regime, whatever its true intentions, unlike Libya, which had 
refused to hand over Lockerbie suspects,103 had offered to hand over Osama 
bin Laden to a neutral Islamic country such as Jordan upon a showing of 
credible evidence.104  This offer would have allowed the neutral country to 
try bin Laden for the charges levied against him or his organization.105  By 
refusing this offer, the United States might be considered the party in 
violation of Article 2(3) and Article 33 of the UN Charter.106  Article 2 
requires states to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered.”107  Article 33 requires parties to a dispute, “the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security,” to first seek a solution by peaceful means.108 
Furthermore, in addition to violating Articles 2(3) and 33 of the UN 
Charter, the United States’ retaliatory attack on Afghanistan should not be 
168 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
regarded as an act of self-defense even though the Security Council held 
that the U.S attacks on Afghanistan were justified under Article 51.109  
Afghanistan’s involvement in the attacks on U.S. soil did not rise to the 
degree of state sponsorship.  The United States has a better argument that its 
attacks were justified because state inaction was present under the Corfu 
Channel rationale, though that rationale provides a fundamentally weak 
justification. 
The other U.S justification, not entirely based on self-defense, is that al 
Qaeda and the Taliban had hijacked the state of Afghanistan and the United 
States was not only protecting its interest but was also liberating 
Afghanistan.  The United States could also argue that it was not undertaking 
self-defense measures, which are subject to some necessary preconditions, 
but was after being directly attacked, taking “proportionate 
countermeasures” (a phrase that is yet largely undefined, under the rationale 
of the Nicaragua case) after being directly attacked.110   
III. THE CONTINUED ATTACKS ON AFGHANISTAN AND SELF-
DEFENSE 
Alternatively, assuming that the initial U.S. attack on Afghanistan 
satisfied the requirements of Article 51, the question becomes whether the 
United States’ continued bombing of Afghanistan would still qualify as 
self-defense under Article 51.  It should be noted that self-defense measures 
under the Article can only be taken to the extent that the “armed attack” has 
not ended.111  If the armed attack has ended, any retaliation would be 
retributive or punitive in nature, and thus, the action would not conform 
with Article 51.112  
Determining whether the armed attack against the United States had 
ended prior to its extensive bombing of Afghanistan requires defining when 
the termination of an armed attack occurs.  The international community 
has restrictively defined the termination of an armed attack.113  For 
example, the 1986 U.S. bombing raids on Libya were condemned, as Libya 
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was not engaged in a current ongoing armed attack against the United 
States.114  Likewise, Israeli military incursions across the UN armistice line 
in 1956115 and the Israeli bombing of Hezbollah positions in Southern 
Lebanon in 2006 were internationally condemned.116 Israel’s justification 
for its actions, based on the accumulation of event theory, was rejected.117  
The international community took the contrary view and held that sporadic 
and isolated incidents by armed groups, even if with state support, did not 
constitute an armed attack.118 
Some critics forcefully argue that the UN has recently preferred an 
expansive view relative to the notion of the duration of an armed attack.119  
This was the case when the United States attacked Iraq in 1993 with cruise 
missiles.120  The cruise attack was based on the rationale that an 
assassination attempt against the former U.S. President George Bush when 
visiting Kuwait was an armed attack in process against the United States.121  
This was not an armed attack because the attempt was never carried to 
fruition, and the threat of such an act had subsided before the United States 
attacked Iraq because President Bush had safety returned to the United 
States.122   
Despite this questionable logic, criticism of the United States for its 
attacks on Iraq during the 1990s by the UN was lacking.123  A superficial 
analysis of such recent developments does seem to suggest that that the 
expansive view of the duration of an armed attack has displaced the 
restrictive view.124  However, that is not the case.  The UN’s muted reaction 
to American attacks on Iraq was not because the view of the international 
community relative to the duration of armed attack had changed.  The real 
reason for the lack of criticism was because the United States had surfaced 
as a hegemonic state in the 1990s, and individual states had strategically 
decided not to be critical of the United States.  States were concerned that 
any criticism could make them vulnerable to the possibility of adverse 
measures taken against them by the United States.  These states rightly 
feared that the serious unilateral U.S. punitive measures that might follow 
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would have a crippling effect on their respective economies.  It is 
reasonable to suggest that if any other state besides the United States had 
taken such retaliatory actions against Iraq, it would have indeed been 
subject to immense condemnation by the world community.  The restrictive 
notion of armed attack therefore still exists. 
The September 11 attacks ended after they were perpetrated.  In addition, 
the fact that no subsequent attacks have been witnessed against the United 
States confirms this conclusion.  Any future probability of an attack is a 
mere threat.  As mentioned earlier, any retaliation to threats is an act of 
anticipatory self-defense and therefore cannot be justified under Article 
51.125  
A. Customary International Law and Self-Defense under Article 51 
Even when self-defense is appropriate under Article 51, a state must 
conform to the requirements of necessity, proportionality,126 and 
immediacy.127  These three variables act as constraints on unqualified 
retaliatory action and are essential elements of customary international 
law.128  It is imperative that these three variables are analyzed against the 
backdrop of Article 51’s enactment.  Utilizing such an analysis will not only 
provide a clearer comprehension of such elements, but will also clarify the 
intent of the drafters of the Charters with regard to the scope of the use of 
force to fall under Article 51.  
During the era preceding the enactment of Article 51, certain acts of 
anticipatory self-defense were held to conform to the necessity and 
proportionality requirements of customary international law.  For example, 
the world community somewhat accepted British actions in 1940 as 
reasonable and proportional in nature for the purposes of self-defense when 
Britain destroyed the Oran fleet of the Vichy French government129 before it 
fell in the hands of the Germans and could have been used against Britain.  
After witnessing the ruins of World War II, the world community drafted 
the Charter with the precise goal of preventing future war at all costs.130  
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The drafters no longer considered anticipatory forms of self-defense as a 
viable option of self-defense, as it was precisely the kind of act that 
fomented an armed conflict.  When the adequacies of the requirements of 
necessity, proportionality, and immediacy are examined, it is essential that 
an extremely restrictive approach be taken in order to realize the intent of 
the framers of the UN Charter in proscribing anticipatory forms of self-
defense. 
1. Immediacy Requirement 
First, the immediacy requirement of self-defense is inextricably tied to 
the necessity requirement131—if an action taken in self-defense does not 
require immediacy, then it is de facto unnecessary.  Waiting too long to 
retaliate is also proof that the action eventually taken was not one of last 
resort.132  The time limitation is also present to prevent innumerable state 
reprisals to prior unlawful acts of force.  The critical nature of a timely 
response can best be illustrated by analyzing the Caroline dispute between 
the United States and the United Kingdom, which related to the 
unsuccessful 1837 rebellion in Upper Canada against British rule.133  Then 
U.S. Secretary Daniel Webber, during the exchange of diplomatic notes 
between the involved governments, presented the often-quoted framework 
for self-defense relative to immediacy and necessity.  Under the framework 
for the Caroline paradigm, only when the danger posed to a state is “instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation”134 can a state respond.   
The United States attacked Afghanistan a whole month after the 
September 11 attacks.  This was a calculated decision and was subject to 
extensive deliberation.  Such a decision suggests that the danger posed to 
the United States was neither instant nor overwhelming.  Thus, the 
immediacy requirement was not met.135  
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2. Necessity Requirement 
Second, the necessity requirement can only be met when all other 
alternative peaceful means of resolution of the dispute or issue are 
exhausted, given the time constraints involved.136  The Caroline paradigm is 
equally applicable to the necessity requirement137—there must be no other 
choices nor moments of deliberation available before undertaking self-
defense.138   
In recent decades, rapid technological advancements in the warfare 
industry have rendered the necessity analysis extremely complex,139 as 
hostile states possess nuclear-laced delivery systems capable of destroying 
states within a span of minutes.  Although these new technological 
developments need to be factored into the necessity analysis, no form of 
anticipatory defensive measures can be tolerated.  This system might be far 
from perfect, but adoption of alternative paradigms would invite disaster.  
In today’s nuclear day and age, any form of anticipatory self-defense 
justification can easily trigger a nuclear war.  
It was unnecessary for the United States to attack Afghanistan for self-
defense purposes.  Afghanistan, which is not a state sponsoring terrorism, 
had made repeated requests to the United States for credible evidence of bin 
Laden’s as well as al Qaeda’s involvement in the terrorist attacks.  This was 
a reasonable request, but the United States paid it no heed.  Afghanistan had 
also offered to hand over bin Laden to a neutral country such as Jordan,140 
where he would have been tried for a determination of culpability under 
Jordanian law.  The United States again ignored Afghanistan’s proposal, 
which was extremely unreasonable on its part, because of the United States’ 
ratification of the Montevideo Convention and because of the UN Charter’s 
provision for sovereign equality of all states.   
The United States has ratified the Montevideo Convention of 1933, under 
which states are juridically equal.141  The UN Charter provides for the 
sovereign equality of all states.142  An essential corollary of sovereign 
equality is the principle that the courts of one state do not question the 
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validity of acts carried out in another.143  Hence, the United States is under 
an obligation to respect the credibility of the judicial systems of other 
member states.  In addition, the United States enjoys considerable political, 
military, and economic prowess as compared to Jordan, a key U.S. ally.144  
If bin Laden were handed over to Jordan,145 the United States would in fact 
have had the power to influence bin Laden’s indictment, even if in reality 
there was not enough proof to indict him under the Jordanian judicial 
system.  In fact, the United States even may have been able to extradite bin 
Laden to the United States from Jordan.   
This dilemma of choice of law is the result of U.S. foreign policy.  
Specifically, the United States impeded the creation of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) because of fears that U.S. executives and Israeli 
officials would become subject to the authority of the ICC and possibly be 
indicted for war crimes as a result of military adventurism.  Had the ICC 
been in existence, bin Laden and other al Qaeda members would have been 
charged with international crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC and 
would then be adjudged within the auspices of this unbiased international 
court.  
The unreasonableness of the United States’ stance is further substantiated 
by the fact that President Bush publicly stated on several occasions that no 
bargaining was to take place with Afghanistan.146  The only way the Taliban 
could avoid a U.S. armed attack was to hand over bin Laden immediately 
and allow the United States to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan 
for the purpose of hunting down supposed terrorists and ensuring the 
closure of all training camps, “the Madrassahs,”147 which provided both 
Islamic education and military training.148  In fact, President Bush had 
further sent a message to the Taliban administration that it would “pay a 
price”149 if it did not hand over bin Laden.150  This is surely not the proper 
way to bargain, especially with a fundamentalist regime like the Taliban.   
Afghanistan functions under a tribal code of conduct under which honor 
is the most salient feature of the system.  Any act challenging the honor of 
174 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
the Afghanis compels them to sacrifice their lives if the need is felt, no 
matter the consequences.151  Rather than challenging the Afghani culture 
and values, the United States should have been more tolerant and 
understanding of the Afghani culture.  Surely engaging the Afghanis in a 
less hostile manner could have rendered productive results, even to the 
extent that this whole dispute could have been solved through alternative, 
peaceful means over time.  All these various facts are sufficient proof that 
the United States did not exhaust all alternative peaceful,152 diplomatic, 
political, and bargaining means to deal with the issue at hand.153  
The concept of necessity in self-defense also requires that the use of self-
defense bring an end to the dangers present.  The U.S. bombing did not 
accomplish this feat in any way.  First, none of the terrorists involved in the 
terrorist activities on September 11 were Afghans; they were all Arabs.154  
This suggests that the root cause of such terrorism, as well as the major 
operatives and finances of these outfits, are not present in Afghanistan but 
in countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  Thus, an attack by the United 
States against Afghanistan cannot purport to address the initial threat of 
terrorism emanating from the Middle East.  However, the United States has 
not penalized these other countries because that would jeopardize the U.S. 
oil supply provided by these Arab states.   
Second, the objectives of the bombing were vague, and no concrete goals 
in this fight against terrorism had been clearly outlined.  Other Muslim 
states such as Iran have been vaguely indicated as likely future targets for 
fomenting terrorism.155  Carpet and cluster bombing from miles in the sky 
resulted in the deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians and children, and the 
destruction of numerous mosques.156  These actions infuriated the Muslim 
masses all around the world,157 and as a result, for every genuine terrorist 
killed in such military encounters, hundreds are born daily in the Muslim 
world.  Even by crushing the Taliban, the U.S. bombing campaign in 
Afghanistan did not alleviate, but rather increased, the danger of future 
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attacks on the United States.  Therefore, the U.S. actions did not end the 
danger as required for self-defense. 
The correct, advisable, and peaceful alternative solution to this terrorism 
problem is for the United States to revise its foreign policy.  By not taking 
sides in the Palestine and Israel conflict and by not supporting and/or 
providing military assistance to Israel, the United States would help 
decrease the distrust, hatred, and anger it faces in the Muslim world.  As a 
result, such terrorist acts fueled by frustration would not be supported or 
undertaken by most Muslims.  Israel has used U.S. military equipment and 
economic aid for all sorts of aggression against Palestine and other Arab 
states and has, on numerous occasions, been condemned by the UN for such 
aggression.158  However, with the UN General Assembly resolutions 
ineffectual in the face of U.S. resistance,159 these Arab states view Israel 
and the United States as the same entity—the aggressor. 
3. Proportionality Requirement 
The final requirement of self-defense, proportionality, is two-pronged.160  
Under the first prong, the response must be proportional to the wrong 
suffered.161  In other words, the adverse impact on the attacked party must 
be proportionate to the damages suffered by the state acting in self-defense.  
Therefore, a self-defense action in which large parts of enemy territory are 
occupied on the basis of self-defense would not be proportional162 if the 
action was taken in retaliation to minor border skirmishes.163   
Some believe that proportionality should be measured not by the impact 
and damage inflicted on the enemy state’s military and governmental 
installations, but rather by the impact on innocent civilians.  This is 
unreasonable because damage to government infrastructure will indirectly 
and invariably result in an adverse impact on civilians.  The 1991 and 1993 
Gulf Wars are prime examples of this phenonom, in which a 
disproportionate number of civilians died as a result of American 
destruction of Iraqi infrastructure and international sanctions.164  
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The second prong of proportionality is that “the response must be 
proportional in terms of the nature and the amount of force employed to 
achieve the objective or goal”;165 therefore, the acting state’s actions must 
be confined to the removal of the danger.  Indiscriminate bombing of a state 
charged with terrorism, rather than strategic precision-guided bombing of 
only terrorist camps and related infrastructure, is not a proportionate 
response.166 
The U.S. attack on Afghanistan was far from proportionate under 
customary international law.167  First, under the first prong of the 
proportionality requirement, the culpability of the Afghani establishment 
(state support) with regard to the terrorist attacks on September 11 was not 
of such a level that it could be subjected to a full-fledged war.  The damage 
inflicted on Afghanistan was extremely disproportionate to the damage 
inflicted on the United States on September 11.168   
The United States destroyed an already moth-ridden government 
infrastructure.  It demolished what remained of airports, government 
buildings, mosques, old homes, and hospitals which barely operated in this 
poor state.  In addition, on numerous occasions, international aid workers 
were killed, and buildings belonging to international organizations such as 
the International Red Cross were also destroyed.169  The United States also 
continued pointless bombing of the cities of Kabul and Gardez even when 
the Taliban had long retreated from these cities.   
With regard to direct human lives lost, the response was grossly 
disproportionate between the United States and Afghanistan.  The loss of 
life in the United States was estimated at 2,973 people.170  On the other 
hand, not only did thousands of innocent Afghani civilians die directly as a 
result of American bombs, but 900,000 people faced imminent starvation—
twenty percent of which were under the age of five.171   An additional 2.5 
million people were displaced and attained refugee status.172  The U.S. 
bombing has also created a political vacuum in the country, raising renewed 
fears of a civil war and strife. 
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Under the second prong of the proportionality requirement, the intensity 
of the U.S. bombing was far from the lowest degree of force needed to 
attain the stated objective.  Rather than sending U.S. ground troops to 
Afghanistan to battle with the Taliban and the al Qaeda network at the 
outset, which would have ensured minimal Afghani civilian causalities and 
other forms of related damages, the United States engaged in air bombing to 
avoid suffering war casualties.  Bombs and missiles cannot distinguish 
between terrorists and civilians.  In turn, these bombs did not specifically 
target so-called terrorist camps, but rather were indiscriminately used.173  
More civilians than Taliban fighters died in the attacks.174  The United 
States’ use of carpet and cluster bombs was not precision guided.  Exploded 
cluster bombs killed hundreds of civilians, and unexploded bombs became 
land mines causing casualties when mistaken for food drops.175  For all 
these reasons, U.S. activities in Afghanistan did not meet the proportionality 
requirement. 
B. Self-Defense as an Interim Right 
Self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter is an interim right—a 
state must cease retaliatory operation when “the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”176  The 
United States’ bombing of Afghanistan was more or less unilateral.  One 
has to reject as circular any argument on the part of the United States 
justifying its continuing war against the Taliban and al Qaeda on the 
grounds that the Security Council had not taken the appropriate measures 
under Article 51.  After all, it was the United States and NATO which 
prevented the Security Council from taking the adequate measures.177   
Notably, the General Assembly and the Security Council had passed 
numerous resolutions on the War on Terror.178  The General Assembly 
resolution passed on September 12, 2001, stressed that “those responsible 
for aiding, supporting, or harboring the perpetrators, organizers, and 
sponsors of such acts will be held accountable.”179  It further outlined the 
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need for all actions taken in the future to be concerted and multilateral.180   
The Security Council on September 28, 2001, again unanimously agreed 
upon the need to tackle terrorism and undertake collective action.181  
Building upon its previous resolution182 and overriding the conventional 
regime concerning international terrorism, Resolution 1373 affirmed the 
right to self-defense; however, it failed to lay down a definition of 
international terrorism,183 thereby leaving the decision as to what counts as 
international terrorism to individual states.  Resolution 1373 provides states 
with the discretion to take unilateral action in the name of countering 
international terrorism.184  
In the case of Afghanistan, the United States continued to act by itself, 
with some assistance from its NATO ally, Britain.185  Similar unilateral 
decision making on the part of the United States was witnessed in 2003 with 
its operations in Iraq.  One could argue that after escaping any liability in 
Afghanistan, the United States used Iraq as a way to further gauge its 
position vis-à-vis the Security Council.  There is also debate over whether 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was the United States’ way of testing ground for 
Iran.186 
Once the Security Council agreed that the United States was justified in 
its initial attack against the Taliban187 and that a severe act of aggression 
and breach of peace had taken place, it was relatively easy for the United 
States to make the Security Council determine under Article 39188 that use 
of force was required under Article 42189 of the Charter.  This is because 
Article 41190 measures had already been deemed ineffective against 
Afghanistan.  (Article 41 includes the use of economic, communication, and 
diplomatic measures for the purpose of forcing a state to comply with the 
mandates of the Security Council.191)  In recent years, all but three states 
had severed diplomatic relations with Afghanistan.192  Afghanistan was also 
under severe economic sanctions, and all international flights to and from 
Afghanistan, with the exception of a handful of humanitarian aid-related 
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flights, were banned.  However, as previously noted, such measures did not 
affect the strength or the policies of the Taliban government.  
Hence under Article 43,193 the United States and any other UN member 
could have been directed to continue using force against the Taliban and al 
Qaeda; such collective action and resources would have been more effective 
in tackling the threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.  In other 
words, international peace and security could have been maintained.  It 
defeats the purpose of the Charter if a claim of inaction is made on behalf of 
the UN when the United States itself is wholly responsible for such UN 
inaction. 
The environment that prevailed in the world arena at that time was also 
very conducive to a concerted and multilateral force sanctioned by the 
Security Council being deployed against Afghanistan.  The nature of the 
current terrorism problem is such that the vested interests of all the 
permanent members of the Security Council are aligned.194  Russia and 
China, who generally oppose U.S. international policy decisions, have 
provided unstinted support to the United States.195  These states themselves 
hold the Taliban and Osama bin Laden responsible for instigating Islamic 
insurgent movements on their soil.  Besides, by aligning with the United 
States, Russia and China are aware that the United States would no longer 
be as critical, in at least the interim, of human rights violations that they 
have committed or will continue to commit generally or in the course of 
crushing secessionist movements.  These two nations have always viewed 
their actions as internal matters.196  In fact, other large countries such as 
India have aligned with the United States for precisely the same reasons.197  
In addition, different and more efficient military tactics could have been 
utilized by the aforementioned multilateral force with the objective of fully 
accomplishing the goals that the United States is striving to achieve.  Small, 
specialized, and trained commando units, drawing recruits from a multitude 
of nations, directly under the command and control of the UN,198 could have 
targeted al Qaeda camps in a hit-and-run ground offensive with the aim of 
180 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
assassinating or capturing bin Laden, his operatives, and the top brass of the 
Taliban government.  This operation could have been undertaken by 
utilizing the most sophisticated weaponry coupled with the assistance of the 
Northern Alliance, which consists of the army of northern Afghans fighting 
the Taliban.   
Once individuals such as bin Laden and Mullah Omer, the supreme 
commander of the Taliban, had been disposed of, the Taliban regime would 
have automatically crumbled.  Afghanistan is a fragmented country, torn by 
civil war and ethnic strife for decades.  Without a central Taliban command, 
this militia would have been too weak and unable to stop the numerous 
powerful local warlords from overrunning it.  Therefore, under this 
alternative military tactic, thousands of civilian lives, which were lost 
through indiscriminate U.S. bombings, could have been saved.  
IV. REMEDIAL MEASURES 
Though seemingly appealing, revising Article 51 would have adverse 
repercussions for international peace and security, especially if the balance 
of powers shifted in the international arena.  Unilateral action by states 
would inevitably lead to attacks in anticipatory self-defense.  The language 
the framers of Article 51 utilized was very specific and was chosen after 
extensive analysis and deliberations, with the objective of minimizing the 
evil of war—the major variable that threatens international peace and 
security.  Article 51, from its inception, has been extremely effective in 
achieving the objective of controlling and preventing wars. Any 
modifications to Article 51 are, therefore, a recipe for disaster.  
The solution to this problem is that states should not attack other states 
without waiting for the results of a thorough international investigation of 
factual disputes regarding state terrorism.  In other words, states must not 
retaliate against other states unless the threat of terrorist attacks, based on 
publicly disclosed facts, is of utmost gravity, and no other options are 
available for the retaliating state to prevent an imminent attack.  In addition, 
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the UN must undertake a two-step retroactive review of actions taken after 
all the events have unfolded.199  The UN must undertake a retroactive 
review of actions to determine: (1) the credibility of the threat faced by the 
retaliating state, and (2) the appropriateness of the state’s use of force.200  
The UN must not sanction unwarranted conduct.201   
The UN must also determine what level of remedial action undertaken by 
a state said to have indulged in terrorism alleviates the culpability of that 
state, and to what extent.  There is, however, some guidance on this issue.  
In 1988, the International Court of Justice considered whether remedial 
actions taken by Libya were sufficient to mitigate the terrorist conduct in 
which it was accused of participating.  The court rejected Libya’s claim that 
Libya’s trial of its own nationals for terrorism against civil aviation was 
sufficient under the Montreal Convention of September 23, 1971.202  The 
court held that the supposed terrorists, who were thought to be Libyan 
agents, had to be extradited.  Therefore, it can reasonably be argued that 
nothing short of handing over a state terrorist can even qualify as a remedial 
measure.203   
V. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. attacks on Afghanistan cannot be justified on the basis of self-
defense.  Although the United States was subjected to an armed attack, 
Afghanistan cannot be seen to have undertaken the attack itself because the 
nature of the relationship between Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban militia and 
the terrorists who had undertaken the attack was not sufficient to establish 
the existence of state sponsorship.  However, even assuming the United 
States had authority under Article 51 to attack initially, its ongoing bombing 
of Afghanistan was not authorized because the action against the United 
States stopped on September 11, 2001, and the United States failed to 
consistently conform with norms of customary international law of 
necessity, immediacy, and proportionality.  The United States’ response and 
similar actions undertaken by other states would only be in compliance with 
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international law if the UN Charter itself is revised to explicitly broaden the 
scope of Article 51 to accommodate and sanction such use of force.  
However, because this approach is not advisable, the UN should play a 
more proactive role, with a greater involvement of the General Assembly in 
tandem with the Security Council, in establishing processes and 
mechanisms to deter conflagration of conflicts.  
Specialized and empowered UN monitoring bodies (i.e., the United 
Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee)204 must make swift, transparent, 
and comprehensive fact-finding determinations concerning any acts of 
aggression that can potentially invite retaliatory responses from states.  
Such UN bodies would themselves be directly answerable to both the UN 
General Assembly and Security Council.  All states contemplating 
retaliation under Article 51 must engage with such bodies and give due 
consideration to the determinations provided before taking any military 
action.  Unless no other options are available for the retaliating state to 
prevent the imminent attack, the retaliating state should be subject to UN 
sanctions.  The mechanism should be such that all states, regardless of their 
economic and military status, should feel confident in approaching the UN 
and having their grievances resolved in an equitable and a diplomatic 
manner. 
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